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Secrecy Outage Analysis of k-th Best Link in
Random Wireless Networks
Satyanarayana Vuppala, Member, IEEE, Sudip Biswas, Member, IEEE and
Tharmalingam Ratnarajah, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we analyze the secrecy characteristics
of random wireless networks using stochastic geometric tools.
The locations of the source and eavesdropper nodes are modeled
as independent two-dimensional Poisson point processes. We
investigate the secrecy outage probability of such networks from
the perspective of the k-th best source, which has still not been
well characterized. In particular, we derive the received path gain
distributions of the typical destination and the eavesdropper from
the k-th best source. Furthermore, we introduce a novel concept
of security-region based on the k-th best source index. This is
pragmatic in creating a protected communication zone for the
typical destination and also to bound the number of sources
that can coordinate in a Coordinated Multi-point transmission
(CoMP) network. We further derive the secrecy outage proba-
bility for these CoMP sources based on the security-region. We
also provide a closed-form expression for the maximum number
of eavesdroppers for a given secrecy outage constraint, which
can effect the secure communication. Tractable numerical and
simulation results are presented under various assumptions of
densities, path loss exponents and antenna figures.
Index Terms—Secrecy outage, random wireless networks,
stochastic geometry, fading, k-th best source index.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the variety and the number of users of wireless networks
grow, wireless security is becoming increasingly crucial in
communication systems, leading researchers to investigate
information theoretic approaches to achieve secrecy in the
wireless channel. In recognition to these challenges, consider-
able efforts have been made by authors in [2]–[4] to develop
information-theoretic security, which enhances the chance of
a secure communication in the presence of eavesdroppers.
The theoretical foundations of information-theoretic secu-
rity was led by Wyner, who introduced the concept of wire-
tap channel and analyzed the existence of reliable transmission
conditions to achieve perfect secrecy in discrete memoryless
channels [5]. Since then, the concept of information-theoretic
security, i.e., physical layer security, has been extended to spe-
cific channels, such as additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channels by Cheong and Hellman [6], and broadcast wireless
channel by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [7].
Obviously, previous works in the area such as those afore-
mentioned are marked by significant abstraction from practical
applicability, with various factors of relevance ignored for
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the sake of simplicity, to include: 1) the fact that wireless
channels are often subjected to fading and 2) the fact that
communicating devices compose networks often of unknown
topology (randomly distributed nodes).
A few decades later, the increasing prospect of putting infor-
mation theoretical secrecy concepts to actual use has motivated
the community to deepen its understanding of the inherent
secrecy capabilities of wireless systems by taking into account
more realistic conditions of the wireless medium. Addressing
point 1, for instance, the secrecy capacity of wireless fading
channels was investigated in [2], [3] with expressions for the
outage probability and average secrecy capacity of quasi-static
fading channels also derived expressions in [4]. Considering
point 2, and specifically when studying wireless secrecy in
random networks using stochastic-geometric tools [8], the
notion of secrecy graphs has emerged [9].
Following this trend, secrecy capacity scaling laws were
studied in [10], and recently a new perspective on the role of
node spatial distribution with wireless propagation mediums
and aggregate network interference on network secrecy has
been given in [11]. The secrecy capacity of unicast links in
the presence of multiple eavesdroppers was investigated in
[12], where the transmission to the k-th legitimate node was
based on the order of the distance between the source and the
destination.
Although, lately a considerable amount of reasearch has
been done on intrinsic secrecy in random wireless networks
[12]–[21], most current works focus on systems with single
antenna and/or mainly study prorogation without fading or
with Rayleigh fading [13], Nakagami fading [12], log-normal
fading [16], and composite fading [17]. Hence, it is imperative
to devise a more general model which can take into account
any of the above mentioned fading scenarios. Furthermore,
previous work on the impact of multiple antennas in random
networks with secrecy constraint is not vast. However, the
issue has not entirely escaped the attention of the community.
For instance, while the authors in [22], [23] studied the
secrecy multi-antenna transmission with artificial noise, [24]
studied physical layer security in heterogeneous networks.
Recently, [25] investigated the secure multi antenna transmis-
sion impaired by artificial noise and imperfect channel state
information (CSI) in the presence of Poisson point process
(PPP) based eavesdroppers.
Stochastic geometry approaches have recently gained sig-
nificant attention to develop tractable models to analyze the
performance of wireless networks [26]. In this approach, the
wireless network is abstracted to a convenient point process
that is used to capture the network properties. A homogeneous
PPP is the most popular and tractable point process to model
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the locations of users and base stations in wireless networks.
Similary, for inhomogeneous PPP based wireless networks,
approximate signal to interference ratio analysis in general
heterogeneous cellular networks is given in [27], while in [28]
inhomogeneous Poisson sampling of finite-energy signals with
uncertainties is given. Considering user association criteria in
cellular networks, users are generally connected to the nearest
source in terms of either considering the distance between
users and source or received signal power at the users. De-
pending on these association criteria, users receive the message
from either the nearest source or best source or the k-th best
source. The best source can be considered to be the one that
provides the user with the maximum received path gain. The k-
th best source can be considered to be any potential source that
provides the k-th maximum path gain to the user. The concept
of k-th best source can be linked to Coordinated multi-point
transmission (CoMP) networks, where more than one sources
combine to provide the destination with higher gains. In such a
scenario, it is of paramount importance to identify the K∗ best
sources out of K sources that can communicate securely with
the destination. In this work, we identify a region comprising
of such ordered K∗ best nodes. We denote this region as the
security-region of the network. Hence, it is intuitive to derive
the k-th best path gain distribution between the typical user
and the source. To the best of authors’ knowledge, the secrecy
capacity considering the k-th best path gain at the legitimate
user or eavesdropper has not been evaluated. Furthermore,
security-region can be considered as an important performance
metric when designing such wireless networks.
In this paper, we address the mentioned challenges by
deriving the received k-th best path gain distributions from the
sources to the destination and eavesdroppers and expressions
for the secrecy outage probability of random networks in the
presence of eavesdroppers. We also introduce the concept of
security-region for a given secrecy outage constraint based on
the K∗ best sources. At this point we would like to state
that this model is applicable to any fading scenarios and
also for models which include colluding eavesdroppers. The
contributions of this work are multi-fold and are given as:
• We derive the received path gain distributions of the
typical destination and the eavesdropper from the k-th
best source under general fading model.
• Using the above results, we derive the secrecy outage
probability Pout for different scenarios with respect to
the received path gain from any random source and the
k-th best source under a general fading model.
• For a given secrecy outage constraint, a novel security-
region concept is introduced. Henceforth, all the system
parameters are looked upon based on this concept which
gives a better insight into the secrecy capacity regions of
random wireless networks.
• We obtain closed form expression for the limiting number
of ordered sources that can participate in the CoMP.
• We also give a bound on maximum number of eaves-
droppers which can effect the communication for a given
secrecy outage constraint based on the received signal
power.
• Finally, we give the aggregate path gain distribution
for CoMP sources with respect to Rayleigh fading and
a general fading scenario which is approximated with
the gamma model. The CoMP sources include only the
sources which are within the security-region.
Our findings indicate that the security-region can be consid-
erably improved by an increase in the density of sources. Fur-
thermore, we give a bound on the number of sources that can
coordinate among each other to form the CoMP network. One
can construct the CoMP sources by selecting all the best nodes
instead of random sources from the security region in the
network. Selecting the best sources to coordinate among each
other can further improve the security of the network. Hence
the CoMP sources within the security-region enhances the
achievable secrecy capacity of the network. With both results
in mind, the joint conclusion is that with the additional sources
associated in the CoMP network, complex signal processing
techniques are required to process the received signals and also
maintain the required coordination among the sources. This
may increase the complexity of the network and for systems
with smaller dimensions and relaxed power constraints, it
might be beneficial to use only the best source instead. An
interesting outcome of the analysis is that providing insights
on the uncertainty on the number of eavesdroppers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
system model is described in Section II, where the formula-
tions of the secrecy outage probability and security-region are
also briefly revised, while in Section III, we characterize the
path gain distributions of the sources to the destination and
the eavesdroppers. Moreover, in this section, we also derive
expressions for the secrecy outage probabilities of random
networks with multiple transmit antennas under generalized
fading scenarios. In Section IV, we derive the aggregate path
gain distribution from all the sources under a CoMP network
followed by the derivation of the secrecy outage probability.
Based on these derived expressions, numerical results are
drawn and briefly discussed in Section V. Finally, concluding
remarks are offered in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a network in Euclidean space of dimension d,
modeled by a homogeneous PPP [29] with multiple source,
destination and eavesdropper nodes. The sources and eaves-
droppers location processes are denoted by Φs and Φe re-
spectively with corresponding densities λs and λe. The source
and the eavesdropper PPPs are considered to be independent
of each other. Without loss of generality, the source nodes
can be interpreted as transmitters while the destination nodes
and eavesdroppers as receivers. The sources transmit with the
same power Pk for k ∈ [1 : K], where K is the total number
of sources in the network. Without loss of generality, let the
location of a given destination node define the origin of the
space. Hereinafter, we consider the typical destination as the
center of our analyses.
As shown in Fig. 1, consider that the sources wish to
transmit information to a destination node, in the presence
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TABLE I: Notations
Notation Description
K Total number of sources
Φ Poisson Point Process (PPP)
λ Density of the PPP
ζk The received path gain from k-th source
ζˆk The received path gain from best source
ζ`k The received path gain from k-th best source
ζ¯k The aggregate path gain from all sources
Rs Target rate
α Path loss exponent
Nt Number of antennas
of eavesdroppers, both subjected to generalized fading and
path loss governed by the exponent α. We assume the sources
to be equipped with Nt antennas. The antenna elements
are deployed with a spacing of half the wavelength of the
transmitted frequency to secure minimal correlation between
the channels. All the destination nodes and eavesdroppers
are each equipped with single antenna. The nifty thing about
single antenna nodes is that they are inexpensive, simple and
power efficient while still providing each node with high
throughput. Moreover, the assumption that the nodes have
single antennas can be considered as a special case of nodes
having multiple antennas when we treat the extra antennas as
if they were additional autonomous nodes.
Under the consideration of separate encoding scheme at
each source, ith source sends an information symbol si
through a linear beamforming vector vi = [ν1i , · · · , νNti ]T
with unit norm, i.e., ||vi||2 = 1, i ∈ Φs. Therefore, the
received signal at the typical destination can be given as
y =
√
Pkh1,kvkr
−α/2
k sk︸ ︷︷ ︸
desired signal
+
∑
i∈Φs
h1,ivir
−α/2
i si︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference
+ω1, (1)
where h1,i = [h11,i, · · · , hNt1,i ] ∈ C1×Nt is the downlink
channel between ith source to the typical destination1 and each
entry is independently identically distributed (IID) complex
gaussian random variable with zero mean and unit variance.
ω denotes the additive Gaussian noise and rk is the distance
between the k-th source and the typical destination.
The received SINR for the typical destination and any
eavesdropper can now be given respectively as
ζ˜k ,
Pk|h1,kvk|2rk−α
σ2 +
∑
i∈Φs
Pk|h1,ivi|2r−αi
, (2)
ζ˜e ,
Pk|he,kvk|2re−α
σ2 +
∑
i∈Φs
Pk|he,ivi|2r−αi
. (3)
Hereinafter, in conjunction to [13], for a given number of
sources, we consider a interference-limited scenario. Thus,
1The subscript 1 in h1,l corresponds to the typical destination.
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Source	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Typical	  Des1na1on	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Eavesdropper	  
2-­‐nd	  Best	  Source	  
4-­‐th	  Best	  Source	  
1-­‐st	  Best	  Source	  
3-­‐rd	  Best	  Source	  
K-­‐th	  Best	  Source	  
Random	  Source	  
Fig. 1: An illustration of a network modeled by an overlay
of sources, a typical destination and eavesdroppers and the
security-region (dotted lines) with first 4 best sources.
the secrecy capacity between any k-th source and a typical
destination is given as [30]
Cs = max{0, log2 (1 + ζkρ)− log2 (1 + ζeρ)}bit/s/Hz, (4)
where
ζk =
Pk|h1,kvk|2rk−α
Ik , (5)
ζe =
Pk|he,kvk|2re−α
Ie , (6)
with Ik =
∑
i∈Φs
Pk|h1,ivi|2r−αi ,
and Ie =
∑
i∈Φs
Pk|he,ivi|2r−αi denoting the aggregate interfer-
ence power2 at the destination and eavesdropper, respectively.
Hereinafter, for notational simplicity, we remove the subscript
1 from the channel vector.
Consequently, the probability that the secrecy capacity of
such a channel is below a given threshold Rs ≥ 0 – hereinafter
referred to as secrecy outage probability – is defined as [30]
Pout , Pr{Cs < Rs} = Pr
{
log2
(
1+ζk
1+ζe
)
< Rs
}
, (7)
The secrecy non-outage probability between the source and
destination node (in the presence of randomly located multiple
eavesdroppers) can be derived from (7) as
Pout =
∞∫
0
∞∫
β(y)
fζe(x)fζk(y)dxdy, (8)
=
∞∫
0
(1− Fζe(β(y)))fζk(y)dy,
where β(y) = [2Rs(1 + y) − 1], fζ and Fζ denote the
probability density function and the cumulative density fuction
of ζ respectively.
2For tractable analysis, we assume that the received interferences at the
destination and eavesdropper are independent.
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We now rewrite the secrecy outage probability for the k-th
best source in presence of the best eavesdropper as
Pout = Pr
{
log2
(
1+ζ`k
1+ζˆe
)
< Rs
}
, (9)
where ζ`k and ζˆe are defined in Table I. Similarly, the secrecy
outage probability expression follows for the case of CoMP
network with ζ¯k and ζˆe. For such an interference limited
scenario, we consider Rs = 0 in order to make the analyses
tractable and obtain closed-form expressions.
We now introduce a new metric, security-region, from the
perspective of the best source index. Note that, this concept
of security-region is significantly different from the security
region as described in the literature [30], [31]. It can be
defined as the region in which the set of ordered K∗ nodes
can safely communicate with typical destination for a given
secrecy outage constraint. These set of K∗ nodes are the nodes
that combine to form the CoMP network.
S , {(K∗, ),∀K∗ ∈ {1, · · · , k∗},Pout ≤ }, (10)
where k∗ is the limiting value of K for a given secrecy outage
constraint. This limiting value, which defines the security-
region will be computed in following section.
III. SECRECY CHARACTERIZATION: SELECTION OF
SOURCE
In this section, we characterize the path gain distribution of
the destination node from the source node or nodes considering
three particular scenarios. In scenario 1, the destination node
can receive signals from any source while in scenario 2, it
can receive signals from the best source. In scenario 3, the
destination node can receive the signal from the k-th best
source.
A. SCENARIO 1: Any Random Source
To begin our analysis, in this section we consider a Rayleigh
fading model. However, in the later sections, we generalize our
analysis for any fading models and path loss exponent values.
1) Received Path Gain Distribution from a Source: We
intend to characterize the secrecy outage probability of a
communication link between any source and typical desti-
nation. Hence, the distributions of interest concerning the
legitimate network are those corresponding to the path gain
of each legitimate source ζk. Hence, Hk = |hkvk|2 which
follows a chi-square distribution [32] with 2Nt degrees of
freedom. Recall that the probability density function of chi-
square distribution can be given as
Hk ∼ f(x) = N
Nt
t
Γ(Nt)
xNt−1e−Ntx. (11)
The cumulative density function for the path gain distri-
bution from the source to the destination node is given in
following Lemma.
Lemma 1. The path gain distribution from a random source
to the destination node can be given as
F¯ξk(z) =
Nt∑
k=1
(
Nt
k
)
(−1)k+1 exp
−2pi2λsr2kz 2α k 2α
αsin( 2piα )
 (12)
Proof. A detailed proof is given in Appendix A.
2) Path Gain Distribution of the Best Eavesdropper: In
order to obtain an expression for the secrecy outage probability
as in equation (7), the distribution of the path gain ζe needs to
be derived. However, in contrast, for a given legitimate path
gain ζk what determines the secrecy capacity of a channel
subjected to fading is not any specific eavesdropper, but rather
the eavesdropper with the maximum3 (instantaneous) path gain
amongst them.
Lemma 2. The path gain distribution of the best eavesdropper
can be given as [33]
Fζˆe(z) = exp
(
−piλez
−2
α Eξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
))
. (13)
and, an integral-form expression for Eξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
)
is given in
Appendix C.
Proof. A detailed proof is given in Appendix B.
Under the assumption of interference cancellation at eaves-
dropper’s side, the received best path gain can be given in
following corollary.
Corollary 1. The path gain distribution of the best eavesdrop-
per4 can be given in interference-free network as
Fζˆe(z) = exp
(
−piλez
−2
α EH
(
h
2
α
e
))
. (14)
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 2.
With possession of path gain distributions of channels from
sources to the destination node and the best eavesdropper
channels as derived in the preceding subsections, the secrecy
outage probability can now be given as
Pout = 2
α
Nt∑
k=0
(
Nt
k
)
(−1)k+1β
∞∫
0
e−β y
2
α y
2
α−1
(
1−e−Ξey
−2
α )dy,
(15)
where β =
2pi2λsr
2
kk
2
α
αsin( 2piα )
and Ξe = piλeEξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
)
.
Unfortunately, the above integral in (15) does not admit a
closed-form solution. However, for a given α = 2, the closed-
form of the secrecy outage probability is given as
Pout = 2
Nt∑
k=1
(
Nt
k
)
(−1)k+1(
√
βΞeK1[2
√
βΞe]), (16)
where Ka[b] is the modified Bessel function of the second
kind.
3Here, it is implicitly assumed that eavesdroppers do not collude. The
scenario with collusion will be discussed in future work.
4The best eavesdropper can be considered to be the one that receives the
maximum path gain.
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B. SCENARIO 2: Best Source
Let us consider the case where the typical destination is able
to identify which of its candidate sources has the maximum
path gain, subsequently associating to that source.
In the context of our analytical framework, this assumption
implies that the secrecy capacity of the channel in question is
governed by the statistics of the maximum path gain amongst
the sources. One can find the path gain distribution of best
source using the similar approach from lemma 2.
Lemma 3. The path gain distribution of the best source to
the destination (ζˆk) can be given as
Fζˆk(z) = exp
(
−piλsz
−2
α Eξk
(
ξ
2
α
k
))
. (17)
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 2.
Now, using Proposition 1 and 2, we can derive the secrecy
outage probability with respect to the best source and the best
eavesdropper.
Proposition 1. The secrecy outage probability of the best
source channel to the destination in presence of the best
eavesdropper can be given as
Pout = Ξe
2
−2Rs
α Ξk + Ξe
, (18)
where Ξk = piλsEξk
(
ξ
2
α
k
)
.
Proof. A detailed proof is given in Appendix D.
At this point, it is worthwhile to elucidate a few qualita-
tive remarks on the secrecy outage probability expression as
derived in (18).
Corollary 2. Considering similar fading and interference
conditions at the destination and eavesdroppers, the secrecy
outage probability can be given as
Pout = λe
2−
2Rs
α λs + λe
. (19)
Proof. Proof follows directly from Proposition 1.
Remark 1. It can be noted that the above expression is
precisely the same as the probability of achievable secrecy
rate found in the AWGN channel [34]. The result that Pout is
independent of fading and interference is intuitively acceptable
and the secrecy outage probability only depends on the path
loss exponent and the density of the nodes.
C. SCENARIO 3: k-th Best Source
This case relates to the scenario studied in [2], [4], in the
sense that the selection of the device with the “best channel”
can either occur in terms of the “best node” at a given time
owing to the quasi-stationarity of the channel – as assumed
in [4] – or in terms of the “best time” – as assumed in [2].
Subsequently, we consider for the sake of completion, the case
where the k-th source provides the destination with the k-th
maximum path gain.
Lemma 4. The path gain distribution of the k-th best source
(ζ`k) can be given as
Fζ`k(z) =
Γ
(
(2Rsz)
−2
α Ξk, k
)
(k − 1)! . (20)
Proof. Denoting the distribution of path gain from the k-th
best source node to typical destination by Fζˆk , we have [35]
Fζ`k(z) = Pr(0 · · · k − 1 points in (z,∞)), (21)
=
k−1∑
j=1
Λj(z,∞)
j!
e
−Λj
(z,∞) =
Γ
(
(2Rsz)
−2
α Ξk, k
)
(k − 1)! ,
where the intensity measure Λ(z,∞) (from the proof of Propo-
sition 2) can be given as
Λ(z,∞) =
∞∫
z
λˆ(y)dy. (22)
Now, considering Lemma 4, the secrecy outage probability
with respect to the k-th best source can be given as below.
Proposition 2. The secrecy outage probability for the link
between the destination and the k-th best source in presence
of the n-th eavesdropper can be given as
Pout =
k−1∑
j=0
Γ(j+n)2
−2jRs
α (Ξk)
j(Ξe)
n
j! Γ(n)
(
1
2
−2Rs
α Ξk + Ξe
)j+n
.
(23)
Proof. This derivation of this proof follows in a similar way
as the proof of Proposition 1 and hence is omitted here.
Remark 2. For k = 1 and n = 1, Proposition 2 converges
to Proposition 1 and the corollaries derived in the preceding
subsections also hold for this scenario.
Now, in the following proposition we characterize the
security-region of our system. From Proposition 2, one can
obtain the maximum possible k-th index for a given secrecy
outage constraint .
Proposition 3. The limiting number of ordered sources that
can securely communicate with the destination in presence of
the best eavesdropper can be given as
k∗ = log Υ
Υ+1
(1− ) . (24)
Proof. By defining Υ = 2
−2Rs
α Ξk
Ξe
, Pout in Eq. (23) can be
re-written for the best eavesdropper case i.e n = 1 as
Pout =
k−1∑
j=0
Υj
(Υ + 1)j+1
. (25)
The Eq. (25) can be expressed as a geometric series with
common ratio as
Υ
Υ + 1
and the first term as
1
Υ + 1
. One can
accordingly write the secrecy outage probability in (25) as
Pout =
(
1
Υ + 1
)
1− ( ΥΥ+1 )k
1− ΥΥ+1
. (26)
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Finally, the limiting value of K, i.e k∗, sources for a given
secrecy outage constraint  can be given from above equation
(26) as
k∗ = log Υ
Υ+1
(1− ) . (27)
Corollary 3. From the previous Proposition 3, using infinite
geometric series, the secrecy outage probability Pout → 1
when k →∞.
This shows that in CoMP networks, it may not be useful to
consider all the sources in the network. Instead, it is important
to take into consideration only the limiting number of sources
as stated in the previous proposition.
To draw another parallel with the literature on random
networks, if cooperation is a part of the communication system
used by legitimate nodes, it must be assumed that the same
strategy will be exploited by eavesdroppers as well. The
expressions derived in this paper may also be applicable to
the scenario when the eavesdroppers are cooperating. This
eavesdropper’s cooperation can also be interpreted as collusion
among the eavesdroppers. Therefore, we give a bound on
maximum number of such eavesdroppers which can effect
the communication for a given secrecy outage constraint in
following proposition.
Proposition 4. The maximum number of eavesdroppers that
effects the secure communication for a given secrecy outage
constraint  can be computed as
n∗ = log 1
Υ+1
() . (28)
Proof. This proof is obtained from Proposition 3 by keeping
k = 1.
IV. SECRECY CHARACTERIZATION: COMP WITHIN THE
SECURITY-REGION
To analyze a scenario with coordinated multi-point sources,
we assume that all the sources exchange required ideal infor-
mation amongst themselves through a backhaul connection.
This scenario provides maximum achievable secrecy capacity
and tells the network designer the number of K best sources
sufficient to achieve the ultimate secrecy performance of the
network.
In this section we consider a CoMP network of sources
based on the security-region. We assume that only the sources
within the security-region are allowed to coordinate among
each other to form the CoMP network. Since the security-
region depends on the source node’s secrecy outage proba-
bility, the set of sources that fall within the security-region
may be considered as an inhomogeneous Poisson point process
which can be obtained via location-dependent thinning of
Φs. To be specific, such conditions are clearly distinct from
the random and uniformly distributed network assumptions
that lead to a Poison number of nodes per unit area i.e.,
the PPP model – commonly adopted in recent stochastic
geometry literature. To this end, the Matern hardcore models
(Type I and Type II) of point processes are more suitable.
However, the characterization of such models via the Laplace
Functional and probability generating functionals is in reality a
challenging problem. Therefore, the hard-core point processes
are quite difficult to analyze due to the simple reason that their
probability generating functionals do not exist [36]–[39]. But,
it has been argued in [36], [37] that the nodes further away
from the hard core distance, d can still be modelled as a PPP.
Furthermore, it has been shown in [38] that MHCPP type II is
better approximated with a PPP rather than Type I. Hence we
assume that the total limiting number of sources to follow a
Poisson distribution while they are still non-uniformly located
within the coverage area of the cell due to thinning. Therefore,
the set of transmitting best sources follow inhomogeneous
PPP Φ¯s with a density of λ¯s. Now, the distribution of the
equivalent aggregate source path gain ζ¯k is required in order
to characterize the secrecy rate of random networks. Thus, we
have
ζ¯k =
∑
x∈Φ¯s
|hx|2||rx||−α. (29)
Further, we consider two cases, namely, 1) without interfer-
ence and 2) with interference to characterize the secrecy rate
of the network. Case 1 may be applicable for scenarios, such
as when the density of non co-operating source nodes are very
less, when perfect interference mitigation techniques under the
assumption of perfect channel state information is considered,
etc. Case 2 on the other hand is the more general case,
where interference is one of the major bottlenecks affecting
the performance of the CoMP network.
A. Without interference
Under the consideration of this model and the use of
Campbell’s theorem, the characteristic function of ζ¯k can be
computed by [40] as
φζ¯k(w) = exp
−2piλ¯s∫
H
∫
R
·[1− ejwxr−α ] · fH(x) drdx
, (30)
where j is the imaginary unit.
Corollary 4. For the case of Nt = 1, one can obtain the
distribution of aggregate path gain with α = 4 as
Fζ¯k(z) = erfc
[
pi2 λ¯s
4
√
z
]
. (31)
Proof. A detailed proof is given in Appendix E.
Proposition 5. The secrecy outage probability in presence of
the best eavesdropper for CoMP sources with α = 4 and
Nt = 1 can be given as
Pout = 1− e
Ξ2e2
Rs+2
pi4λ2s erfc
(
2Ξe
√
2Rs
pi2λ¯s
)
. (32)
Proof. With possession of corollary 4, the secrecy outage
probability using equation (9) can be given as
Pout =
∫ ∞
0
x−
2
α−1e−Ξex
−2/α
erfc
(
pi2λ¯s
4
√
2Rsx
)
dx,
= 1− e
Ξ2e2
Rs+2
pi4λ2s erfc
(
2Ξe
√
2Rs
pi2λ¯s
)
, (33)
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density and α.
where the above integral is a particular case of [41, pp. 31,
Eq. 1.5.2.1].
Unfortunately neither equation (30) nor its inverse Laplace
transform admits a closed form expression except for the
specific case of fading [13]. However, the aggregate path gain
can be characterized using their cumulants. Hence, we employ
equation (30) to obtain the corresponding closed forms of
the cumulants. Specifically, the i-th cumulant of φ(w) can be
given by
κ(i) =
1
ji
dn log φ(w)
dwi
∣∣
w=0
(34)
After a series of integral calculations (refer to [40] for
detailed derivations),
κζ¯k(i) =
2piλ¯s
iα− 2EH
(
h
2
α
k
)
. (35)
The closed form expressions of κζ¯k(i) under Nakagami-m and
Log-Normal distributions are also provided in [40].
Based on this exact cumulant expression as given in (35),
various models for the distribution of the equivalent aggregate
eavesdropper gain can be built. In this paper we discuss the
gamma distribution model. The interested reader is referred to
[42], to obtain more insights on the use of gamma variables.
Modeling ζ¯k as a Gamma Variate:
In order to obtain a more tractable and accurate model for
the distribution of ζ¯k, we consider a gamma model given as
fζ¯k(x; ν, θ) =
xν−1e−
x
θ
θνΓ(ν)
, (36)
where the parameters ν and θ are given by
ν =
κ2
ζ¯k
(1)
κζ¯k(2)
and θ =
κζ¯k(2)
κζ¯k(1)
. (37)
with the cumulants κ2
ζ¯k
(1) and κ2
ζ¯k
(2) being characterized
using equation (35). For the simulation of approximation
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Fig. 3: Kullback-Leibler Divergence between Gamma Distri-
bution and Empirical Distribution for various α.
model, we have considered a Rayleigh fading channel with
Nt antennas. Therefore, the i-th cumulant can be given as
κζ¯k(i) =
2piλ¯s
(iα− 2) ·
Γ(Nt + i)
N itΓ(Nt)
. (38)
The accuracy of the Gamma model is illustrated in Fig.
3, where the empirical cumulative density function (CDF)
of ζ¯k is compared against the Gamma distribution given in
equation (36) for various α and λ¯s. The results indicate that
the Gamma approximation is in fact quite tight. Further the
accuracy of gamma distribution can also be verified with
Kull-back divergence between Monte-Carlo simulations and
analytical approximation in Fig. 3. Note that interested readers
can refer to [12] for more insights on Kull-back divergence.
Likewise, this gamma approximation is also justified in recent
literature [16], [42].
Proposition 6. The secrecy outage probability in CoMP
considering the gamma model to characterize the aggregate
path gain in the presence of the best eavesdropper can be
given as
Pout = 2Ξe
α
∞∫
0
1− exθ ν−1∑
j=0
xj
j!θj
 e−Ξex− 2α x− 2α−1 dx. (39)
Proof. Proof is given in Appendix F.
Corollary 5. Consider severe signal attenuation (e.g., densely
built urban area), the path loss exponent α = 4. Accordingly,
the secrecy outage probability considering CoMP sources can
be given as
Pout =1 + 2Ξe
α
(
Ξeθ
j−1Γ(j − 1) 0F2
(
;
3
2
, 2− j;−Ξ
2
e
4θ
)
(40)
−θj− 12 Γ
(
j − 1
2
)
0F2
(
;
1
2
,
3
2
− j;−Ξ
2
e
4θ
)
−2Ξ2j−1e Γ(1− 2j) 0F2
(
; j, j +
1
2
;−Ξ
2
e
4θ
))
.
Proof. Proof follows directly from the Proposition 6.
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B. With Interference
By taking interference into account, the path gain distribu-
tion for the CoMP can be re-written as
ζ˜k =
∑
x∈Φ¯s
|hx|2||rx||−α
I¯k , (41)
where I¯k is the interference from the sources that do not coop-
erate among each other5. The density of such non-cooperating
source nodes denoted as λi. The optimum outcome of CoMP
is to aggregate the power of all information signals which can
leads to minimum secrecy outage. However, the aggregation of
all the signals from the nodes which does not have sufficient
power may not be a good practise. Thus, it is important
to select the best nodes for the aggression process. In the
following Lemma, we will provide a closed-form expressions
for such aggregation by leveraging the analysis from [43].
Lemma 5. The CDF of the aggregate path gain in CoMP
scenario with interference can be given as
Fζ˜k(z) =1−
∫
0<ξ1<···ξK<∞
LI¯k
(
z∑
e∈Φe
x−1e
)
fξ(x)dx, (42)
where
fξ(x) =
∏
s∈Φ¯s
2
αpiλ¯s x
2
α−1e−piλ¯sx
2
α , (43)
and, LI¯k(.) follows from the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. A sketch of proof is given in Appendix G.
Using equation (7), the probability of non-zero secrecy
capacity is given by
Pout =
∞∫
0
Fζ˜k(z)fζˆe(z)dz, (44)
where fζ`(z) can be obtained by taking derivative of F¯ζ`(z)
in (42) and Fζe(z) follows from Lemma 2. Unfortunately the
above integral does not admit closed-form. However, one can
evaluate the integral numerically.
Remark 3. As stated before, the noise-limited case is a
special case for scenarios, such as when non co-operating
source nodes are very less in the network or when perfect
interference mitigation techniques under the assumption of
perfect CSI is considered. Hence, Lemma 5 can be simplified
to Corollary 4 under the assumption of the above mentioned
cases. Accordingly, the secrecy outage probability defined in
equation (44) simplifies to equation (33).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we validate the system model and also
verify the results mentioned in the propositions. In general,
the computations are done through Monte Carlo simulations
which are then used to validate the analytical results. Unless
stated otherwise, most of the values of the parameters used
5Note that, the nodes that do not cooperate among each other are the ones
that do not participate to form the security region.
TABLE II: Simulation Parameters
Notation Parameter Values
λs Density 0.001 m−2
λe Density 0.001 m−2
Rs Target rate 0.1 bits
α Path loss exponent 2, 4
Nt Number of antennas 5
P Node transmit power 1 Watt
are inspired from the literature mentioned in the references.
For the system guidelines, we mention these parameters and
their corresponding values in Table II.
With the expressions derived in the previous section, we can
study the availability of secrecy in random wireless networks
in the presence of randomly distributed eavesdroppers. Let us
consider any random source transmitting a message to the
typical destination. Hence, the secrecy outage probability is
given according to (16) whose plot is shown in Fig. 4. In
this figure, we consider the impact of number of antennas and
eavesdropper’s density on the secrecy outage probability.
As the value of Nt increases, the secrecy outage probability
is relatively improved. Thus Fig. 4 suggests also that as the
relative distance between source and destination increases,
the secrecy outage increases. This figure basically helps in
validating our results with the already established results in
literature related to the number of antennas, eavesdropper
density and the secrecy capacity.
Now, consider the case where the typical destination is
associated to the best source rather random source. Fig. 5a
shows the secrecy outage probability as a function of the k-
th best source for different number of source densities. For
this simulation the values of the parameters considered are :
λe = 0.001, Nt = 5 and α = 2. Also the target rate is kept
constant at Rs = 0.1. It is evident from the figure that as we
increase the best source index, the secrecy outage probability
also increases. The best source index can be interpreted either
in terms of the fading gain or distance from the source.
Similar settings are considered in Fig. 5b except for the source
density which is now kept fixed at λs = 0.001. This figure
complements the results of the previous figure for different
values of λe. Hence, we can conclude that when the typical
destination is receiving from the k-th farthest node, the secrecy
outage probability increases in an ascending order.
Under the assumption that the typical destination and the
eavesdroppers experience the same fading at any particular
time for a given k-th best source and the best eavesdropper
pair, the secrecy outage probability may not depend on the
fading conditions. Hence, the eavesdropper density, the path
loss exponent and the k-th source index play a major role in
determining the secrecy probability in such a scenario.
Following the footprints of Fig. 5, we now plot the secrecy
outage probability in Fig. 6 with a special case of eavesdropper
strategy, where eavesdroppers perform perfect interference
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Fig. 4: Secrecy outage probability as a function of λe for
various figure Nt.
cancellation. Henceforth, only the source nodes are considered
to be subjected to interference from the interferers. It is
intuitively clear from the figure that the increasing density of
sources leads to an increase in the secrecy outage probability
which is in-contrast to Fig. 5a results. However it can be
explained from fact that the interference impacts the legitimate
communication severely and leads to secrecy outage. There-
fore, cooperation among source nodes need to be considered
in-order to improve the security of the system.
Leveraging from Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we now depict the
mentioned results from the point of view of the security-region
in Fig. 7. This figure plots the results derived in proposition
3 and 4. We show both the limiting value of K sources
located inside the security-region and the maximum number of
eavesdroppers that can be accommodated for a given secrecy
outage constraint. These sources inside the security-region can
participate to form the CoMP sources. Two important results
that can be seen from the figure are: 1) the total number of
sources taking part in the communication increases with the
increase in secrecy outage probability constraint and 2) the
total number of eavesdroppers that can affect the communica-
tion decreases with the increase in secrecy outage probability
constraint. The first result can be explained as - relaxing the
outage constraint allows the system to accommodate more
number of users. The second result can be explained as - when
the outage probability is less, more number of eavesdroppers
are required to affect the secure communication and vice versa.
In Fig. 8, the secrecy outage probability is shown with
respect to a target rate for a given eavesdropper density. This
figure complements the previous figures where the first best
source outperforms the second. Here, we also stress on the
fact that when k = 1, Proposition 2 matches with Proposition
1. Furthermore, with the increase in the path loss exponent,
the secrecy outage probability decreases, as is evident from
the figure. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that
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the increase in path loss exponent causes higher distortion in
signal at the eavesdropper for a given best source index.
Fig. 9 shows the comparison between the first best source
and the CoMP sources. It is evident from the figure that the
CoMP sources outperforms the first best source, which is quite
intuitive. However, with the additional sources associated in
the CoMP network, complex signal processing techniques are
required to process the received signals and also maintain the
required coordination among the sources. This may increase
the complexity of the network and for systems with smaller
dimensions with power constraints, it might be beneficial to
use the best source.
An interesting outcome of the analysis is that the uncertainty
of the number of sources communicating safely with the
typical destination does not play a role any more with the
introduction of the security-region. Furthermore, the path loss
exponents and the eavesdropper density also play a major role
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Fig. 9: Comparison of secrecy outage probability for the cases
described in section III and IV as a function of eavesdropper
density.
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in determining the security-region.
Finally in Fig. 10 we compare the secrecy outage probability
as a function of eavesdropper density for the two cases of
CoMP as mentioned in Section IV. The impact of interference
can be clearly seen from the figure, where for a particular
density, the network has more probability of outage when the
interfering nodes are more. Furthermore, increasing the density
of co-operating sources, reduces the probability of secrecy
outage.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, the secrecy characteristics of random wireless
networks with k-th best source indices was studied. The
received path gain distributions of the typical destination and
that of the best eavesdropper from the k-th best source are
derived. Using these results, the secrecy outage probability
Pout is also derived for different scenarios with respect to
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the received path gain from any random source and the k-th
best source. Based on the derived secrecy outage probability,
security-region was defined which describes the number of
sources that can safely communicate with a typical destination.
Specifically, it was shown that the security-region plays
a crucial role in determining the secrecy capacity of CoMP
networks. A bound on the number of sources that can coop-
erate among each other to form the CoMP network can be
given with the help of the security-region. This may be useful
in military applications where communication needs to be
protected (or militarized) within a specific set of transmitters
to guarantee high lever security of data. Moreover, the analysis
presented in this paper can be helpful in determining the
number of eavesdroppers which impact the performance of
the collusion pool. An interesting outcome of the analysis is
that the uncertainty of the number of eavesdroppers does not
play a major role with the introduction of the security-region.
Further, the proposed cooperative scheme requires the in-
stantaneous CSI of all sources, which may not be practical.
However, co-operation can also work with partial CSI with
specific CSI errors that can be implemented in the calculation
of SINR in the paper. Co-operation among the sources with
imperfect CSI will be considered in future extension of this
work.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The CCDF of conditional SINR distribution, Fζk(z), is
F¯ξk(z) = Pr{ξk > z} = Pr
[
Pk|hkvk|2rk−α
Ik > z
]
(45)
= Pr
[
|hkvk|2 > z r
α
k
Pk
(Ik)
]
.
Under the assumption of Rayleigh fading, Hk = |hkvk|2
follows a chi-square distribution [32] with 2Nt degrees of free-
dom and by employing the upper bound of gamma distribution
with parameter Nt such that: P[Hk < γ] < (1−e−Aγ)Nt with
A = Nt(Nt!)
−1
Nt , therefore, the equation (68) becomes
F¯ξk(z) =
Nt∑
k=1
(
Nt
k
)
(−1)kEI
[
exp
(
−z k r
α
k
Pk
I
)]
. (46)
The expectation of interference, i.e Laplace function for the
Ik case is given as
EI
[
exp
(
−z k r
α
k
Pk
I
)]
(a)
= EΦs
{∏
i∈Φs
EHi
[
exp
(−zkrαk Hixi−α)]
}
,
(b)
= EΦs
{∏
i∈Φs
(
1
1 + zrαk k xi
−α
)}
,
(c)
= exp
[
−2piλs
∫ ∞
R
r
(
1−
(
1
1 + zrαk kx
−α
))
dx
]
,
= exp
−2pi2λsr2kz 2α k 2α
αsin( 2piα )
 . (47)
where (a) follows from the assumption of independent small
scale fading, (b) follows from the use of exponential dis-
tributed random variables and (c) follows from the use of
probability generating functionals of PPPs and R ∼ 0. Finally,
this proof concluded by providing the closed-form expression
for the above integral.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let Φe =
{
xi , r−α
}
be a path gain process. By using
Mapping theorem [35], the density function of this point
process can be given as
λ(x) =
2piλe
α
x
−2
α −1. (48)
Let ξ = |he,kvk|2/Ie. Since our propagation process Φs is
also affected by fading and interference, i.e Φ = {yi , ξixi},
the density of this marked point process using the displacement
theorem [35] can be written as
λˆ(y) =
∞∫
0
λ(x)ρ(x, y) dx, (49)
where
ρ(x, y) =
d
dy
(1− Fξe(y/x)) = − yx2 fξe(y/x). (50)
Thus (52) becomes
λˆ(y) =
1
αi
∞∫
0
2piλex
−2
α −1ρ(x, y) dx,
=
1
α
∞∫
0
2piλe x
−2
α −1fξe(y/x)
1
x dx,
(z= yx )=
1
α
2piλe y
−2
α −1
∞∫
0
z
2
α fξe(z) dz,
=
1
α
2piλe y
−2
α −1Eξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
)
. (51)
where the characterisation of Eξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
)
is given in Appendix
C under Rayleigh fading.
Using the void probability of a PPP, the path gain distribu-
tion for best source in the interval (z,∞) can thus be given
as
Fζˆe(z) = exp
− ∞∫
z
λˆ(y)dy
 , (52)
= exp
−2piλe
α
Eξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
) ∞∫
z
y
−2
α −1dy
 .
The proof concludes by evaluating the above integral in
equation (52).
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF Eξe (.)
Let
ξe =
|he,kvk|2
Ie . (53)
Following the footprints of the proof of Lemma 1, the CCDF
of conditional SINR distribution, Fξk(z) is given as
F¯ξe(z) =
Nt∑
k=1
(
Nt
k
)
(−1)kEI [exp (−z k Ie)] , (54)
where the expectation of interference, i.e Laplace function for
the Ie follows from the proof of Lemma 1, is given as
EIe [exp (−zkIe)] = exp
−2pi2λsz 2α k 2α
αsin( 2piα )
 . (55)
The proof concludes after calculating the partial moment of
ξe using (54) as below
Eξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
)
=
2
α
∞∫
0
x
2
α F¯ξe(x)dx. (56)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
In order to evaluate the secrecy outage probability under
scenario 2 as mentioned in Section III, we require the received
path gain distributions at the typical destination and an eaves-
dropper which can be obtained using proposition 3. Using (9),
the secrecy outage probability of the best source link can be
given as
Pout =
∞∫
0
β(x)∫
0
fζˆk(y)fζˆe(x) dydx =
∞∫
0
Fζˆk(β(x))fζˆe(x)dx. (57)
Now, considering the high SNR regime, the secrecy outage
probability can be given as
Pout = 2piλe
α
∞∫
0
e
−piλs2
−2Rs
α x−
2
α Eξk
ξ 2αk

(58)
×x− 2α−1e
−piλex−
2
α Eξe
ξ 2αe

dx,
Let us define the following two equalities
Ξk = piλsEξk
(
ξ
2
α
k
)
, (59)
Ξe = piλeEξe
(
ξ
2
α
e
)
. (60)
Now, the above integral in (58) can be written as
Pout = 2Ξe
α
∞∫
0
e
−
(
2
−2Rs
α Ξk+Ξe
)
x−
2
α
x−
2
α−1dx. (61)
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4
The Laplace transform of the aggregate path gain can be
given as
Lζ¯k(w) = E
[
exp
(
−w
∑
x∈Φs
|hx|2||r||−α
])
, (62)
(a)
= exp
−2piλs∫
R2
Eh[1− ew |hx|2x−α ] · r dr
,
(b)
= exp
(
−piλs Γ
(
1 + 2α
)
Γ
(
1− 2α
)
w
2
α
)
,
where (a) obtained from the property of PPP (Φ); (b) holds
under Rayleigh fading assumption.
The closed form expression for above Laplace transform
can be given from [44] as
f(y)=
pi
3
2λsy
− 32
4
exp
(
−pi
4λ2s
16y
)
. (63)
The proof concludes by taking the integration of the above
equation.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Using the Gamma model for the aggregate path gain variate,
the secrecy outage probability in presence of best the eaves-
dropper from (7) can be given as
Pout =
∞∫
0
Fζ¯(β(x))fζˆe(x)dx, (64)
=
2Ξe
α
∞∫
0
1− exθ ν−1∑
j=0
xj
j!θj
 e−Ξex− 2α x− 2α−1 dx,
where
Fζ¯(x) =
γ
(
ν, xθ
)
Γ(ν)
= 1−
ν−1∑
i=0
1
i!
(x
θ
)i
e−
x
θ . (65)
However, it is worthwhile to note that the above integral
expression doesn’t admit a closed form solution except for
the specific case when α = 4.
After evaluating the above integral, the closed form expres-
sion for secrecy outage probability for the specific case α = 4
is given as
Pout =1 + 2Ξe
α
(
Ξeθ
j−1Γ(j − 1)0F2
(
;
3
2
, 2− j;−Ξ
2
e
4θ
)
(66)
−θj− 12 Γ
(
j − 1
2
)
0F2
(
;
1
2
,
3
2
− j;−Ξ
2
e
4θ
)
−2Ξ2j−1e Γ(1− 2j) 0F2
(
; j, j +
1
2
;−Ξ
2
e
4θ
))
.
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APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Let
ζ¯k =
∑
s∈Φ¯s
|hs|2rs−α =
∑
s∈Φ¯s
|hs|2ξ−1s , (67)
where ξ−1 = rs−α.
The CCDF of the SINR distribution, F¯ζ˜s(z), is
F¯ζ˜s(z) = Pr{ζ˜s > z} = Pr
[
ζ¯s > zI¯k
]
, (68)
= Eξ,I¯k
Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∑
s∈Φs
hsξ
−1/2
s
∣∣∣∣∣
2
> z I¯k
 ,
(a)
= EI¯k
exp
 z I¯k∑
ξ−1s
 ,
(b)
=
∫
0<ξ1<···ξK<∞
LI¯k
(
z∑
s∈Φs
x−1s
)
fξ(x)dx,
where (a) follows from the cumulative density function of
the exponentially distributed random variable ζ˜s with mean∑
ξ−1 and (b) is due to the expectation with respect to ξ.
The characterization of fξ(x) is omitted here due to space
constraints. The Laplace transforms, i.e LI¯k follows from the
proof of Lemma 1. The proof concludes after substituting this
Laplace transforms into the integral in the above expression.
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